The Unanswered “Question of Questions”: The Jurisdictional Competence of the International Criminal Court by Donohue, Conor
  
 
 
CONOR DONOHUE 
 
 
THE UNANSWERED “QUESTION OF QUESTIONS”: 
THE JURISDICTIONAL COMPETENCE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
 
LAWS523: Law of Armed Conflict 
 
Submitted for the LLB (Honours) Degree 
 
 
Faculty of Law 
Victoria University of Wellington 
2016 
  
  
1 The Unanswered “Question of Questions”: The Jurisdictional Competence of the International Criminal Court 
The Unanswered “Question of 
Questions”: The Jurisdictional 
Competence of the International 
Criminal Court 
 
The negotiation of the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction proved to be highly 
controversial during the Diplomatic Conference at Rome in 1998. Despite this, the 
jurisdiction of the Court has not yet been a major issue in practice. Present situations before 
the Court, such as the situation in Palestine, however, mean that a re-examination of the 
Court’s jurisdictional scope is timely. In this vein, it is argued that territorial disputes 
between a State Party and a non-Party should not act as a bar to the exercise of the Court’s 
jurisdiction, and that the Court’s territorial jurisdiction may be properly understood as 
encompassing ‘objective territoriality’. The Court’s territorial jurisdiction, however, cannot 
be understood as permitting an application of the ‘effects doctrine’. Finally, the issue of 
nationality jurisdiction is explored, and it is concluded that this jurisdictional basis will be 
of limited practicality in the Court’s goal of ending impunity. If such a goal is to be achieved, 
States must be willing to try serious international criminals municipally. 
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I Introduction 
Upon the entry into force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome 
Statute), an unprecedented entity was established – the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
the world’s first permanent international criminal tribunal. The Court was established for 
the noble purpose of ending impunity and ensuring accountability for the most serious of 
international crimes.1 Given this significant aim, it is unsurprising that, during the drafting 
negotiations, the issue of the Court’s jurisdictional scope became the most contentious 
issues2 – the “‘question of questions’ of the entire project.”3 Many conceptually different 
approaches as to jurisdiction were proposed. At one extreme stood the proponents of 
universality,4 at the other, defenders of State consent and sovereignty.5 Such was the 
difficulty in reconciling these two polar opposites that it was not until the final day of the 
Rome Conference that a solution was reached6 – the Court would have jurisdiction over 
crimes which occurred on the territory of, or committed by a national of, a State Party.7 
Before the ink on the final conference document so much as had a chance to dry, 
condemnation was directed at these jurisdictional bases by some States, particularly the 
United States, on the grounds that they opened up the Court’s jurisdiction too far.8 
In contrast to the controversy surrounding jurisdiction at Rome, there has been little 
jurisprudence as to the Court’s jurisdiction in practice. This means that several key 
parameters of the “question of questions”9 remain unanswered. Although there has been 
academic debate on what the Court’s territorial and nationality jurisdiction properly entails, 
                                                 
1 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2187 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 17 July 1998, entered 
into force 1 July 2002) [Rome Statute], preamble. 
2 William A Schabas The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010) at 277. 
3 Hans-Peter Kaul and Claus Kreß “Jurisdiction and Cooperation in the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: Principles and Compromises” (1999) 2 YIHL 143 at 145. 
4 See The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: An informal discussion paper submitted by 
Germany A/AC.249/1998/DP.2 (1998). 
5 Proposal Submitted by the United States of America A/CONF.183/C.1/L.70 (1998). 
6 Schabas, above n 2, at 282. 
7 Rome Statute, art 12(2). 
8 Schabas, above n 2, at 283. 
9 Kaul and Kreß, above n 3, at 145. 
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the matter is now becoming more significant – situations such as Palestine and the Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) bring these issues to the fore. It is timely, therefore, to 
return to that unanswered “question of questions”10 – what is the scope of the Court’s 
jurisdiction? 
The search for an answer requires consideration of several issues. An examination of what 
is known of the ICC’s jurisdictional scheme is undoubtedly essential, as is a consideration 
of the laws of State municipal jurisdiction. In terms of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction, 
issues such as the competence of the Court to prosecute crimes committed in disputed 
territories,11 and to adopt objective territoriality12 and the effects doctrine13 shall be 
explored. Finally, the prospects of nationality jurisdiction, in light of the practice of the 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in relation to ISIL14 and the conduct of the United Kingdom 
(UK) in Iraq,15 shall be considered. An examination of these issues leads to the conclusion 
that the Court’s jurisdiction is narrow. States, in the exercise of their municipal competence, 
must be willing to prosecute individuals for grave international crimes if the dream of ending 
impunity is to become reality. 
                                                 
10 At 145. 
11 Eugene Kontorovich “Israel/Palestine — The ICC’s Uncharted Territory” (2013) 11 JICJ 979; Yaël Ronen 
“Israel, Palestine and the ICC — Territory Uncharted but not Unknown” (2014) 12 JICJ 7. 
12 Jean-Baptiste Maillart “Article 12(2)(a) Rome Statute: The Missing Piece of the Jurisdictional Puzzle” (8 
July 2014) EJIL: Talk! <www.ejiltalk.org>. 
13 Michail Vagias The Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2014) at ch 6. 
14 Office of the Prosecutor “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, 
on the alleged crimes committed by ISIS” (8 April 2015) International Criminal Court <www.icc-cpi.int> 
[“ISIS Statement”]. 
15 Office of the Prosecutor “Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, re-opens the 
preliminary examination of the situation in Iraq” (13 May 2014) International Criminal Court <www.icc-
cpi.int> [“Iraq Statement”]. 
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II The Court’s Jurisdictional Scheme 
A Negotiating Jurisdiction at Rome 
During the Rome negotiations, the problem of jurisdiction became the most difficult issue16 
– the “‘question of questions’ of the entire project.”17 The difficulty arose from competing 
conceptions as to what values should prevail in the Court’s jurisdictional scheme.18 At one 
extreme, Germany proposed a scheme whereby the Court would have universal 
jurisdiction.19 It was argued that States could lawfully exercise universal jurisdiction over 
the crimes in question,20 and that they could delegate this jurisdiction to the ICC.21 
Proponents of universality believed that the Court’s potential and capacity to achieve its 
aims would be limited by requiring the consent of the State of territoriality or nationality.22 
The German proposal had support from many non-governmental organisations,23 but drew 
criticism from some States. Opponents of universality opined that universal jurisdiction was 
not fully recognised as a lawful jurisdictional basis, and expressed concerns as to the 
implications of universality for non-Parties.24 
At the other extreme to the universality proposal was that of the United States. The United 
States proposal required prior consent of both the State upon whose territory the conduct 
occurred, and the State of nationality of the accused, before a prosecution could proceed.25 
                                                 
16 Schabas, above n 2, at 277. 
17 Kaul and Kreß, above n 3, at 145. 
18 See generally Schabas, above n 2, at 278–283; Kaul and Kreß, above n 3, at 145–156. 
19 See The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: An informal discussion paper submitted by 
Germany, above n 4. 
20 At 2. 
21 At 2–3. 
22 Schabas, above n 2, at 279. 
23 See for example International Committee of the Red Cross Concerns on Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court Relating to the Bureau Proposal (Information Conveyed by New Zealand) A/CONF.183/INF/9 
(1998). 
24 Kaul and Kreß, above n 3, at 146. 
25 Proposal Submitted by the United States of America, above n 5. 
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This proposal was largely motivated by a desire to retain control over when the Court could 
prosecute United States nationals.26 
Although some proposals were tabled to reconcile these approaches, the jurisdiction issue 
was so divisive that it was not until the final day of the Conference that the preconditions to 
jurisdiction were agreed upon.27 The Court would have jurisdiction if the State upon whose 
territory the conduct occurred,28 or the State of nationality of the accused,29 were Party to 
the Statute. Even this compromise was controversial, with some nations, including the 
United States, arguing that jurisdiction remained too far-reaching in respect of non-Parties.30 
B Defining the Court’s Jurisdiction 
The ICC’s jurisdiction is its “competence to deal with a criminal case or matter under the 
Statute.”31 The term ‘jurisdiction’ has four different meanings in the Statute: referring to the 
Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction;32 jurisdiction over persons;33 territorial and nationality 
jurisdiction;34 and temporal jurisdiction.35 Although the present piece is concerned with 
territorial and nationality jurisdiction, an understanding of the other senses of the Court’s 
jurisdiction is essential. 
                                                 
26 See generally Monroe Leigh “The United States and the Statute of Rome” (2001) 95 AJIL 124; Dapo Akande 
“The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and Limits” 
(2003) 1 JICJ 618. 
27 Schabas, above n 2, at 282. 
28 Rome Statute, art 12(2)(a). 
29 Article 12(2)(b). 
30 Schabas, above n 2, at 283. 
31 Prosecutor v Lubanga (Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the 
Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 
2006) ICC Appeals Chamber ICC–01/04–01/06 (OA4), 14 December 2006 [Lubanga (Jurisdiction)] at [24]. 
32 At [21]; Rome Statute, art 5. 
33 Lubanga (Jurisdiction), above n 31, at [21]; Rome Statute, art 12(2). 
34 Lubanga (Jurisdiction), above n 31, at [21]; Rome Statute, art 12(2). 
35 Lubanga (Jurisdiction), above n 31, at [21]; Rome Statute, art 11. 
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The Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is outlined in art 5 of the Statute as being genocide;36 
crimes against humanity;37 war crimes;38 and, from 1 January 2017,39 aggression.40 This 
subject-matter jurisdiction may only be exercised over natural persons, not legal persons, 
such as corporations or States.41 Furthermore, the Court has no jurisdiction over offences 
committed by persons when they were younger than 18.42  
Regarding territorial and nationality jurisdiction, the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes where 
the conduct occurred on a State Party’s territory,43 or where it was committed by a Party’s 
national.44 Collectively, these are called “preconditions to jurisdiction”.45 Temporally, the 
Court may only exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed after the date of the Statute’s 
entry into force.46 
Additional to these jurisdictional pillars, there are three mechanisms by which jurisdiction 
may be triggered. First, it may be triggered by a referral to the OTP by a State Party;47 
second, the Security Council, acting pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, may refer a situation to the OTP;48 and third, the OTP may initiate an investigation 
independently.49 Significantly, where a matter is referred by the Security Council, the 
preconditions to jurisdiction need not be fulfilled.50 This reflects the power of the Security 
                                                 
36 Rome Statute, art 5(a). 
37 Article 5(b). 
38 Article 5(c). 
39 Article 15 bis(3); Resolution RC/Res6: The Crime of Aggression (2010) (annex I) Amendments to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court on the crime of aggression) [Resolution RC/Res.6]. 
40 Rome Statute, art 5(d). 
41 See Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co 621 F 3d 111 (2d Cir 2010) [Kiobel (2d Cir)] at 136–137 for a 
discussion of this. 
42 Rome Statute, art 26. 
43 Article 12(2)(a). 
44 Article 12(2)(b). 
45 Article 12. 
46 Article 11. 
47 Article 13(a). 
48 Article 13(b). 
49 Article 13(c). 
50 Article 12(2). 
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Council to create ad hoc criminal tribunals,51 as it did in relation to the Former Yugoslavia52 
and Rwanda.53  
C Territorial Jurisdiction 
The Court may exercise jurisdiction were the “State on the territory of which the conduct in 
question occurred” is a Party to the Statute.54 To date, all prosecutions, aside from situations 
referred by the Security Council, have relied upon territoriality.55 Despite this, little 
jurisprudence on the ICC’s territorial jurisdiction exists. The Court’s analysis of territorial 
jurisdiction is typically limited to noting its satisfaction on the facts before it. Indicatively, 
in the Bemba Gombo (Arrest Warrant) decision, the Court simply stated that “the crimes 
alleged against Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba are stated to have been committed on [Central African 
Republic] territory”.56 The Court also noted that Bemba Gombo was believed to be a 
national of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), also a Party,57 meaning 
nationality jurisdiction also existed.58 
There has been only one challenge to the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. Callixte 
Mbarushimana, who was charged with having committed war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in the DRC,59 lodged a challenge to the Court’s temporal and territorial 
jurisdiction.60 The challenge to territorial jurisdiction was unusual. It was not alleged that 
the offences took place outside the DRC’s territory, but that the DRC’s referral to the OTP 
                                                 
51 See Prosecutor v Tadić (Jurisdiction) (1995) 105 ILR 453 (ICTY Appeals Chamber) at [37]. 
52 SC Res 827, S/RES/827 (1993). 
53 SC Res 955, S/RES/955 (1994). 
54 Rome Statute, art 12(2)(a). 
55 Schabas, above n 2, at 286; Michail Vagias “The Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
– A Jurisdictional Rule of Reason for the ICC?” (2012) 59 NILR 43 at 54. 
56 Prosecutor v Bemba Gombo (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber III ICC–01/05–01/08–14-tENG, 10 June 2008 [Bemba 
Gombo (Arrest Warrant)] at [15]. 
57 At [15]. 
58 Rome Statute, art 12(2)(b). 
59 Procureur c Mbarushimana (Mandat d’arrêt à l’encontre Callixte Mbarushimana) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 
I ICC–01/04–01/10, 28 September 2010 at [10]. 
60 See generally Prosecutor v Mbarushimana (Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court) Defence 
Counsel for Mbarushimana ICC–01/04–01/10–290, 19 July 2011. 
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did not intend to encompass crimes committed in the region wherein Mbarushimana’s 
alleged offending occurred.61 The DRC did not support this objection,62 and the Court 
concluded that it had territorial jurisdiction.63 Subsequently, however, the Court refused to 
confirm the charges against Mbarushimana.64 
The decision offers little insight into the scope of the Court’s territorial jurisdiction. The 
most significant point of law in the decision is the notion that, in referring a situation to the 
OTP, a State cannot limit the OTP to investigate only certain crimes – the Court will have 
jurisdiction “as long as the crimes are committed within the context of the situation of crisis 
that triggered the jurisdiction of the Court”.65 Although the Mbarushimana decision 
concerned a State referral, it is likely that a referral made by the Security Council would be 
similarly interpreted, such that it could not limit the scope of crimes or persons to be 
investigated.66 
D Nationality Jurisdiction 
As all prosecutions before the ICC have been based upon territoriality,67 there is even less 
jurisprudence on the Court’s nationality jurisdiction. In cases where nationality jurisdiction 
has been referenced, it is largely as an aside. For example, in the Bemba Gombo (Arrest 
Warrant) decision, the Court noted that the accused was a national of a Party after having 
found territorial jurisdiction.68 
The Court’s jurisdiction over nationals of non-Parties, however, has been controversial. If 
the conduct in question occurs on the territory of a Party, the Court has jurisdiction 
                                                 
61 At [23]. 
62 See Prosecutor v Mbarushimana (Decision on the “Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court”) 
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC–01/04–01/10, 26 October 2011 [Mbarushimana (Jurisdiction)] at [15]. 
63 At [39]. 
64 See Prosecutor v Mbarushimana (Decision on the confirmation of charges) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC–
01/04–01/10–465-Red, 16 December 2011. 
65 Mbarushimana (Jurisdiction), above n 62, at [27]. 
66 Prosecutor v Al Bashir (Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I ICC–02/05–01/09–3, 4 March 2009 [Al Bashir (Arrest 
Warrant Decision)] at [45]; Mbarushimana (Jurisdiction), above n 62, at [27], n 41. 
67 Schabas, above n 2, at 286; Vagias, above n 55, at 54. 
68 Bemba Gombo (Arrest Warrant), above n 56, at [15]. 
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regardless of the accused’s nationality.69 The United States maintains the position that for 
the Court to exercise jurisdiction over the nationals of non-Parties would be unlawful.70 
Such arguments, however, have been agreed to be untenable, particularly as there is no such 
restriction applicable in the laws of State jurisdiction.71 
E La Compétence de la Compétence 
An international tribunal has “jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction”.72 This doctrine 
is known as la compétence de la compétence. It is an inherent power,73 which has been 
applied consistently and without controversy by many tribunals.74 In both the Nottebohm 
(Preliminary Objection) and Arbitral Award cases, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
observed that, absent agreement to the contrary, “an international tribunal has the right to 
decide as to its own jurisdiction and has the power to interpret for this purpose the 
instruments which govern that jurisdiction.”75 The compétence doctrine “assumes particular 
force” when the tribunal is pre-established and treaty-based,76 and “can only be taken away 
by a provision framed for that express purpose” in the tribunal’s constitutive instrument.77 
The compétence doctrine undoubtedly applies in international criminal tribunals. In the 
Tadić (Jurisdiction) decision, the Tribunal held that it had the competence to determine the 
legality of its own creation,78 and it is “beyond argument” that the doctrine applies in the 
                                                 
69 Rome Statute, art 12(2). 
70 See for example Proposal Submitted by the United States of America, above n 5. 
71 See generally Leigh, above n 26; Akande, above n 26. 
72 Tadić (Jurisdiction), above n 51, at [18]; La Constancia, Good Return and Medea (United States of America 
v Colombia) (1866) 29 RIAA 121 at 124; Affaire du Guano (Chile v France) (1900) 15 RIAA 99 at 100. 
73 Chittharanjan F Amerasinghe International Arbitral Jurisdiction (Leiden, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2011) vol 
2 at 28. 
74 At 30–31. 
75 Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) (Preliminary Objection) [1953] ICJ Rep 111 at 119; Arbitral Award 
of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v Senegal) (Judgment) [1991] ICJ Rep 53 at [46]. 
76 Nottebohm (Preliminary Objection), above n 75, at 119. 
77 Rio Grande Irrigation and Land Company Ltd (Great Britain v United States of America) (Judgment) (1923) 
6 RIAA 131 at 136. 
78 Tadić (Jurisdiction), above n 51, at [22]. 
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Special Court for Sierra Leone.79 International criminal tribunals apply the doctrine where 
there is a “gap or lacuna” in the rules.80 It serves to fill an “unforeseen gap in the legal 
regulations”, the resolution of which is incidental to the exercise of primary jurisdiction.81 
The ICC has such compétence. The Kony (Admissibility) decision stated the doctrine is 
“enshrined” in art 19(1) of the Rome Statute,82 which requires the Court to satisfy itself that 
it has jurisdiction in all cases before it.83 As such, it is “for the judicial body whose 
jurisdiction is being debated to have the last say as to the way in which its statutory 
instruments should be construed.”84 
The compétence doctrine is crucial in determining the Court’s jurisdictional scope. Contrary 
to the view expressed by some scholars,85 the Statute’s silence on an issue does not imply 
that the Court is incompetent to act. Rather, the Court itself is to resolve these issues,86 in 
accordance with well-established international practice.87 In keeping with the sources of law 
applicable under the Rome Statute,88 and more generally in the interpretation of treaties,89 
                                                 
79 Prosecutor v Kallon (Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction) (2004) 16 BHRC 227 (SCSL Appeals 
Chamber) at [34]. 
80 Prosecutor v Ayyash (Reasons for Decision on Applications Filed by Counsel for Witness PRH012 and 
Order on Confidentiality) STL Appeals Chamber STL-11–01/T/AC, 28 July 2015 at [11]. 
81 Prosecutor v El Sayed (Decision Appeal of Pre-Trial Judge’s Order Regarding Jurisdiction and Standing) 
STL Appeals Chamber CH/AC/2010/02, 10 November 2010 at [53]. 
82 Prosecutor v Kony (Decision on the admissibility of the case under article 19(1) of the Statute) ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber II ICC–02/04–01/05–377, 10 March 2009 at [45]. 
83 Rome Statute, art 19(1). 
84 Kony (Admissibility), above n 82, at [46]. 
85 See for example Kontorovich, above n 11, at 984. 
86 Kony (Admissibility), above n 82, at [46]. 
87 Nottebohm (Preliminary Objection), above n 75, at 119; Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, above n 75, at [46]; 
Rio Grande Irrigation and Land Company, above n 77, at 136; La Constancia, above n 72, at 124; Affaire du 
Guano, above n 72, at 100; Kallon (Jurisdiction), above n 79, at [34]; Tadić (Jurisdiction), above n 51, at [22]; 
Ayyash (Witness PRH012 Application), above n 80, at [11]; El Sayed (Jurisdiction), above n 81, at [53]; Kony 
(Admissibility), above n 82, at [45]–[46]. 
88 Rome Statute, art 21(1)(b). 
89 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1155 UNTS 331 (opened for signature 23 May 1969, entered 
into force 27 January 1980), art 31(3)(c); Situation on Registered Vessels of the Union of the Comoros, the 
Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia (Decision on the admissibility of the Prosecutor’s appeal 
against the “Decision on the Request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to 
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the Court may make recourse to the customary international law rules of jurisdiction to 
determine the scope of its own jurisdiction. 
III State Jurisdiction 
A Introduction 
State jurisdiction refers to the power to lawfully make and enforce rules.90 There is 
uncertainty as to whether a State may exercise jurisdiction unless such an exercise is 
prohibited by international law, or if it must rely on some positive permissive rule before 
the exercise of jurisdiction will be lawful.91 
As to the first possibility, the Lotus case held that a State may exercise jurisdiction unless 
there is prohibition on such an exercise.92 On this basis, the Eichmann case concluded that, 
as international law did not prohibit the exercise of universal jurisdiction, its exercise was 
lawful.93 Further support for the Lotus approach arguably comes from Kosovo, wherein the 
ICJ held that international law does not prohibit unilateral declarations of independence, 
without considering whether there was permissive rule as to such declarations.94 
That said, no great reliance on the Lotus proposition is justified.95 Most practice and 
academic opinion supports the proposition that a State may only take jurisdiction where it 
can rely on a permissive rule.96 So widespread was the condemnation of the Lotus case that 
                                                 
initiate an investigation”) ICC Appeals Chamber ICC–01/13 OA, 6 November 2015 at [61], n 135; Prosecutor 
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FA Mann, in his authoritative work on jurisdiction, concluded that “nothing was decided” 
by it.97 
If it is accepted that a State’s jurisdiction depends on permissive rules, those rules can guide 
an understanding of the ICC’s jurisdictional limitations. Two questions arise for 
consideration: first, on what grounds can a State exercise jurisdiction; second, how can this 
inform an understanding of the ICC’s jurisdiction? The latter of these issues shall be 
addressed in detail in Parts V–VII of the present piece, while the former falls for immediate 
consideration.  
The grounds of State jurisdiction can be divided into three categories: first, those bases 
which are undisputed; second, other generally accepted jurisdictional grounds; and third, 
those which are contested – the effects doctrine for present purposes. 
B Undisputed Grounds of Jurisdiction 
There are two undisputable grounds upon which a State may lawfully exercise jurisdiction. 
First, a State may exercise jurisdiction over any conduct within its territory.98 Second, a 
State may exercise jurisdiction over its own nationals abroad.99 The possession of both 
territory and nationals are key constitutive elements of Statehood.100 Thus, the undisputable 
nature of these grounds of jurisdiction largely stems from the fact that they are key elements 
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of sovereignty.101 Territoriality and nationality also correspond with the preconditions to 
jurisdiction in the Rome Statute.102 The Statute, therefore, not only takes a relatively safe 
approach to jurisdiction, but has provisions which may be informed by State practice, given 
the dearth of jurisprudence generated by the Court’s organs. 
1 Territorial Jurisdiction 
So indisputable is territorial jurisdiction that, as early as 1812, it was stated that “[t]he 
jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is 
susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.”103 Whilst this proposition that 
jurisdiction is unlimited within a State’s territory is now qualified by other rules, particularly 
those concerning human rights,104 territoriality remains the most preferred basis of 
jurisdiction.105 
That said, there are moves away from territoriality. Particularly in human rights law, States 
are said to have jurisdiction where they have effective control over an area, despite a lack of 
legal title.106 Thus, the European Court of Human Rights, in Issa, recognised that “a State’s 
jurisdictional competence is primarily territorial”,107 but held that persons are within a 
State’s jurisdiction where the State exercises control of an area outside its territory.108 
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Similarly, persons effectively under a State’s authority are said to be within their 
jurisdiction, even if they are not within their territory.109 Perhaps Mann, renowned for his 
works on jurisdiction, would welcome these developments. He advocated for a more holistic 
approach to jurisdiction, whereby jurisdiction exists where legally relevant facts “belong” 
to the State.110 However, one should be cautious before concluding that these developments 
sound the passing knell of territoriality. Jurisdiction remains inherently territorial, 
particularly in the field of criminal law, if not so much in the field of State responsibility.111 
Whilst a State “should possess jurisdiction over all persons and things within its territorial 
limits”,112 issues arise in cases of cross-border criminal conduct. The point is illustrated by 
the Farrendon case. An Irish Republican, situated in County Donegal, Irish Free State, shot 
and wounded Farrendon, a British soldier, who was within the boundaries of County 
Fermanagh, Northern Ireland – a part of the UK.113 Under applicable UK law, victims of 
crime could seek compensation “from the council of the county in which the murder, 
maiming, or injury occurred”.114 The issue arose as to where the crime occurred – in 
Donegal, located in the Irish Free State, or in Fermanagh, Northern Ireland. It was held that, 
where a person shoots at someone with the intent to wound, that intent is present until the 
victim is struck by the bullet.115 In other words, the crime could be said to have been 
committed in Fermanagh, despite the shot originating from another country, as the intent 
also transcended the border. 
Were this situation to arise today, particularly in the context of a prosecution, both States 
could properly exercise territorial jurisdiction. A State’s territorial jurisdiction encompasses 
crimes committed partially in their territory in two circumstances. First, under the principle 
of subjective territoriality, a State has territorial jurisdiction over all crimes commenced in 
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its territory, even when completed abroad.116 Thus, on the facts of Farrendon, the Irish Free 
State could have prosecuted the shooter, provided the shooting violated her laws. 
Furthermore, Northern Ireland could also have taken territorial jurisdiction, on the basis of 
objective territoriality. By this principle, a State has jurisdiction where “any essential 
constituent element” is committed within their territory.117 The notion of objective 
territoriality is endorsed in the Lotus case,118 and is applied without controversy globally.119 
In determining what amounts to a constituent element of a crime, Courts look for a “real and 
substantial link” with the territory concerned.120 
2 Nationality Jurisdiction 
Nationality jurisdiction refers to the right of States to exercise jurisdiction over nationals 
abroad. Like territoriality, it is uncontroversial.121 The rationale of nationality jurisdiction is 
that a State should not be “transformed into a safe refuge for its own nationals who have 
committed crimes outside its frontiers”.122 It is further based on nationality being a “legal 
bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, 
interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.”123 
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Although international law permits the exercise of nationality jurisdiction, it does not 
generally compel it.124 
There is uncertainty as to whether an accused need be a national of the State asserting 
jurisdiction at the time they offended, or if a later acquirement of nationality is sufficient for 
the exercise of this jurisdictional basis. Although it has been argued that the assertion of 
nationality jurisdiction over someone who becomes a national subsequent to offending 
violates the accused’s right not to be subject to retrospective criminalisation,125 State 
practice indicates that this does not bar prosecution.126 Support for the first approach is also 
found in the field of diplomatic protection, wherein a State cannot make claims on behalf of 
persons who were not nationals at the time of injury.127 
International law does generally restrict a State’s ability to grant nationality,128 as the grant 
of nationality is seen as being within the domestic competence of States.129 That said, most 
States grant nationality to those who are born in their territory, or to their nationals.130 
However, there are some limits on the right to grant nationality. For example, States may 
not grant nationality to nationals of others States with no connection to the naturalising State, 
or upon any discriminatory basis.131  
There is also no bar to holding multiple nationalities.132 In such circumstances, there is 
generally a dominant nationality, that being the State to which the person has “stronger 
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factual ties”.133 For the purposes of other areas of law, such as diplomatic protection, the 
dominant personality takes preference in competing claims.134  
C Other Accepted Grounds of Jurisdiction 
Although States cannot generally exercise jurisdiction over foreigners for conduct 
committed abroad,135 there are some grounds upon which extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
foreigners is accepted, such as protection, passive personality and universality. 
1 The Protective Principle 
The protective principle permits States to exercise jurisdiction over extraterritorial actions 
which threaten their security.136 Most States exercise such jurisdiction,137 as it enables 
protection from threats which would otherwise be non-justiciable.138 Notably, the Courts of 
Israel held that it was a basis upon which jurisdiction could be exercised over Eichmann, 
despite Israel not having been a State during the Holocaust.139 
2 Passive Personality 
Passive personality permits States to act where a victim of a crime committed abroad is their 
national.140 Although there is support for its application to international crimes,141 it is 
inherently controversial. Judge Moore, dissenting in Lotus, noted that passive personality 
would allow a citizen to take with them for “protection” their own nation’s laws, and other 
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persons would be subject to those laws by merely coming into contact with the individual.142 
The principle was heavily criticised by the United States in Cutting’s Case, as it “would 
create dual responsibility in the citizen, and lead to inextricable confusion, destructive of 
that certainty in the law which is an essential of liberty.”143  
3 Universal Jurisdiction 
Universal jurisdiction, originally applicable to piracy,144 is now frequently invoked in 
relation to war crimes.145 Although the legality of exercising universal jurisdiction outside 
of piracy is “probably still not entirely resolved”146 there is growing support for its 
application in relation to crimes within the Rome Statute’s subject matter jurisdiction.147 
Notably, it has been implicitly endorsed by the ad hoc Tribunals through their transfer of 
prosecutions to States who had enacted universal jurisdiction laws.148 The exercise of 
universal jurisdiction is only appropriate where the territorial State is unwilling or unable to 
prosecute.149 As such, universality acts as a final barrier to prevent impunity. 
D The Effects Doctrine 
Finally, the so-called ‘effects doctrine’ has been argued to be a basis of jurisdiction, 
particularly by the United States. Michail Vagias describes the effects doctrine as “the latest 
                                                 
142 SS Lotus, above n 92, at 92 per Judge Moore dissenting. 
143 Cutting’s Case II Moore 228 (1886) at 232. 
144 In re Piracy Jure Gentium [1934] AC 586 (PC) at 589. 
145 Smith, above n 99, at [263] per Lord Collins; The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court: An 
informal discussion paper submitted by Germany, above n 4, at 2–3; R v Finta [1994] 1 SCR 701 at 732–733 
per La Forest J dissenting. 
146 Schabas, above n 2, at 279. 
147 Doot, above n 119, at 817; Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck Customary International 
Humanitarian Law: Rules (Cambridge University Press & International Committee of the Red Cross, 
Cambridge, 2005) vol 1, rule 157; Malcolm N Shaw International Law (7th ed, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2014) at 485–486; Eichmann (DC), above n 93, at 26. 
148 See for example Prosecutor v Bagaragaza (Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of the Indictment 
to the Kingdom of the Netherlands) ICTR Trial Chamber III ICTR-2005–86–11bis, 13 April 2007 at [13]–
[15]; Procureur c Bucyibaruta (Décision relative à la requête du procureur aux fins de renvoi de l’acte 
d’accusation contre Laurent Bucyibaruta aux autorités française) ICTR Trial Chamber ICTR-2005–85–I, 20 
November 2007 at [5]. 
149 Peruvian Genocide Case (2003) 24 ILM 1200 (Spain SC) at 1205. 
23 The Unanswered “Question of Questions”: The Jurisdictional Competence of the International Criminal Court 
variant of territorial jurisdiction, according to which a State has jurisdiction over conduct 
that takes place abroad that produces effects within its territory.”150  
This controversial doctrine originates from the Alcoa case of 1945, which held that “[i]t is 
settled law… that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its 
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which 
the state reprehends”.151 Since then, it has been a part of United States law, particularly in 
competition law. For example, under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 
jurisdiction may be assumed over foreign commerce involving conduct that “has a direct, 
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect” on the United States,152 and, at common law, 
the Courts have jurisdiction where the effects are intended and substantial.153 Such effects 
include “injuries to United States commerce” 154 and price-fixing.155  
Outside of the United States, the effects doctrine has been heavily criticised.156 Many States 
passed legislation to limit the impact of United States jurisdictional claims,157 and made 
active protests about them.158 The Courts of the European Union (EU) also resisted adopting 
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the doctrine for many years.159 That said, in Gencor, which concerned an antitrust merger, 
the European Court of First Instance appears to have applied the doctrine, stating that 
applying a regulation “is justified under public international law when it is foreseeable that 
a proposed concentration will have an immediate and substantial effect in the 
Community.”160 The European judiciary’s jurisdiction, however, has traditionally been 
limited to cases of conduct being implemented from within the EU, more resembling 
traditional territoriality.161  
There is some, albeit limited, application of the doctrine to ‘classic’ crimes. In Mharapara, 
the defendant, employed by the Zimbabwe Mission in Belgium, stole money from the 
Mission.162 The elements of the offence occurred exclusively in Belgium,163 and 
Zimbabwean law did not permit nationality jurisdiction to be exercised.164 It was held that 
the accused could be tried on the basis of territoriality. The Court stated that the traditional 
territoriality principle was “becoming decreasingly appropriate to the facts of international 
life”, due to increased globalisation.165 Thus, it was held that, although the offence occurred 
exclusively in Belgium, Zimbabwe could take jurisdiction over the accused, as the harmful 
effects of the crime were felt in Zimbabwe.166 
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The effects doctrine remains controversial.167 Although more countries now accept the 
doctrine,168 or note its advantages,169 many States still oppose it.170 Such is the continued 
opposition to the doctrine that, as recently as 2014, the Federal Court of Australia rejected 
the proposition that the effects doctrine could constitute international custom.171 Scholars, 
too, oppose the doctrine as moving too far from the traditionally territorial nature of 
jurisdiction.172 The position of the doctrine as a principle of international law remains, at 
best, uncertain.173 
IV The Court’s Competence in Disputed Territory 
A Introduction 
To date, the issue of the jurisdictional competence of an international criminal tribunal in 
situations where territorial title is disputed has been subject only to limited jurisprudence. 
However, following the recognition of Palestinian Statehood by the General Assembly 
(GA),174 the possibility of an investigation into the situation in Palestine became of increased 
international interest. One of the more difficult questions posed by the Palestinian situation 
is whether, and to what extent, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction. As Israel is not a Party to 
the Rome Statute, the Court may only exercise jurisdiction over Israeli nationals for crimes 
committed in Palestinian territory. There is, however, uncertainty as to Palestine’s territorial 
scope. The question of the competence of the Court in situations of disputed territories has, 
therefore, been called into question. As the OTP has opened a preliminary examination into 
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Palestine,175 this question is not of mere academic interest. At some point, the competence 
of the Court in situations of jurisdictional conflict needs to be determined. 
The Palestinian situation has caused a divide in opinion, between those opining that the 
Court may determine the scope of Palestine’s territory for the purposes of establishing 
territorial jurisdiction,176 and those who believe it cannot.177 Much of the debate has 
concerned the actual uncertainty of Palestine’s territory, although there has been some more 
general discussion of the competences of the Court in relation to disputed territory. The 
present piece will, therefore, step away from Palestine specifically, and examine the wider 
arguments surrounding the competence of the Court in disputed territory. Such an 
examination leads to the conclusion that there is nothing truly objectionable about the ICC 
determining, for the limited purposes of its own Statute, whether disputed territory belongs 
to a Party. 
B Disputed Territory: Three Possible Scenarios 
Not all cases of disputed territory will cause jurisdictional difficulties. Assume, for example, 
that States A and B are neighbours, and both States exercise a reasonable claim to Region 
X, such that it is uncertain whose territory it is. A and B engage in an international armed 
conflict for control of X, and war crimes are committed within the region. Were there to be 
prosecutions for these crimes, there are three possible scenarios which may arise, each 
having a different impact on the Court’s territorial jurisdiction. 
First, if both A and B are Parties to the Statute, it does not matter which of these States 
exercises better title to X. Regardless of which does so, the crimes in question occurred 
within a State Party’s territory, although it is unclear which one. The Court, therefore, has 
territorial jurisdiction. 
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Second, if neither A nor B are Parties to the Statute, the status of X is equally irrelevant. 
Regardless of which State exercises better title, it is not a State Party’s territory. Absent a 
Security Council referral,178 the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction.  
Third, if A is a Party to the Statute, but B is not, the status of X is crucial. If X is part of A’s 
territory, the Court will have territorial jurisdiction. If, however, X is part of B’s territory, 
then territorial jurisdiction will not exist. It is this situation with which the ability of the 
Court to make territorial determinations is concerned. 
C The Question before the Court 
In a piece arguing that the ICC does not have the competence to act over crimes in disputed 
territories, Eugene Kontorovich states that “the ICC has not been understood as a border-
determination body, nor has defining the territory of nations ever been part of the work of 
past international criminal tribunals.”179 By way of rebuttal, Yaël Ronen argued that the 
issue which would have to be determined is not the definition of borders, nor the extent of a 
State’s territory, but rather “whether the location where a specific allegedly criminal conduct 
was carried out” is within the State’s territory.180 
Ronen is correct that the issue is not the delineation of borders. It would be an absurd barrier 
to jurisdiction if the Court could not act without delineating an entire contested territory if 
the crimes in question occurred only within a small region of it. However, Ronen’s 
conception of the issue also misses a key point. Rather than the question being whether “a 
specific allegedly criminal conduct” occurred on the territory of a Party,181 the issue is 
whether a constitutive element of a specific allegedly criminal act occurred on a Party’s 
territory. In the adoption of such a test, the jurisdiction issue is not whether the entire border 
of the territory is clear,182 or whether the entire criminal act in question occurred within the 
State Party’s territory.183 It is rather whether one element of the crime occurred within the 
Party’s territory. 
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Such an approach is supported by recourse to the laws of State jurisdiction, particularly the 
doctrine of objective territoriality.184 It is relatively uncontroversial that the ICC is 
competent to adopt this approach to its territorial jurisdiction,185 as outlined in detail in Part 
V of the present piece. Assuming, arguendo, that objective territoriality is applicable in the 
Court’s jurisdictional scheme, the determination to be made in cases of disputed territory 
narrows significantly. The Court would not be required to determine borders, or that the 
whole of the criminal offence occurred on a Party’s territory. All that needs to be established 
is that an essential element occurred on the Party’s territory, a distinctively narrower inquiry 
than that identified by Kontorovich186 or Ronen.187 Such a narrow determination would not 
significantly prejudice the interests on any non-Parties. 
D The Competence of the Court to Make Territorial Determinations 
Kontorovich’s statement that “the ICC has not been understood as a border-determination 
body, nor has defining the territory of nations ever been part of the work of past international 
criminal tribunals”188 also suggests that because the ad hoc tribunals have not been called 
upon to consider their jurisdiction over disputed territory, the Court is incapable of doing so.  
This proposition makes several crucial errors. First, defining State territory has obviously 
never been the “work” of international criminal tribunals. Their “work” is enabling the 
prosecution of international criminals. The real issue is whether the Court can make 
incidental determinations as to upon whose territory the conduct occurred, rather than 
whether it is their task to define international borders, in the same manner as would the ICJ 
or an arbitrator. 
The second error stems from the fact that, unlike the implication in Kontorovich’s argument, 
that an action is unprecedented does not mean it is unlawful. The point is perfectly illustrated 
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in that, although the Security Council had never created a criminal tribunal before the 
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, it was 
implicitly entitled to do so by the Charter of the United Nations, despite the absence of any 
provision granting this specific right.189  
These two errors are reached by ignoring the compétence doctrine. International tribunals, 
including the ICC,190 have the inherent power to determine their own jurisdiction.191 In light 
of this, the issue for determination is not whether the Court has made territorial 
determinations before, but whether so doing is an appropriate use of the compétence 
doctrine. 
After Kontorovich noted that no international criminal tribunal had made a determination as 
to disputed territory,192 the OTP made such a determination. In 2015, the OTP requested 
authorisation to open a preliminary investigation into allegations of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity committed in Georgia in 2008.193 The crimes in question were committed 
in South Ossetia, which issued a declaration of independence in 1992.194 However, the 
international community has not recognised South Ossetia as an independent State,195 there 
having been numerous GA resolutions classifying South Ossetia as Georgian.196 In reliance 
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upon these resolutions, the OTP request for an authorisation concluded that South Ossetia 
was part of Georgian territory, and that territorial jurisdiction could be exercised.197 Granted, 
the request by the OTP is not a Court decision, and it will not be until the Pre-Trial Chamber 
issues its decision on the request that there will be a Court decision on the competence of 
the ICC in relation to disputed territory. However, it is evident that the OTP does not 
consider that territorial disputes act as a barrier to the exercise of jurisdiction. 
A simple application of the compétence doctrine also leads to the conclusion that the Court 
may make incidental territorial determinations. The doctrine serves to fill an “unforeseen 
gap in the legal regulations”.198 As the ICC was a novel creation, being the first permanent 
international criminal tribunal, it is to be expected that not all matters essential to its 
functioning would be included in its Statute. Oversights are inevitable, particularly given 
the well-documented difficulties in negotiating the jurisdictional provisions of the Statute.199 
Given this, the exclusion of an article in the Statute as to the Court’s competence in relation 
to disputed territory cannot be seen to be determinative of a lack of such power, just as the 
absence of a provision in the Charter of the United Nations as to the creation of international 
tribunals did not make such an act unlawful.200 Rather, it is a matter which is appropriately 
addressed through the compétence doctrine. 
                                                 
at [1]; Status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali 
region/South Ossetia, Georgia GA Res 66/283, A/RES/66/283 (2012) at [1]; Status of internally displaced 
persons and refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia GA Res 
67/268, A/RES/67/268 (2013) at [1]; Status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia, 
Georgia, and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia GA Res 68/274, A/RES/68/274 (2014) at [1]; 
Status of internally displaced persons and refugees from Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Tskhinvali region/South 
Ossetia, Georgia GA Res 69/286, A/RES/69/286 (2015) at [1]. 
197 Situation in Georgia (Request for Authorisation of an Investigation), above n 193, at [54]. 
198 El Sayed (Jurisdiction), above n 81, at [53]; see similarly Ayyash (Witness PRH012 Application), above n 
80, at [11]. 
199 See generally Schabas, above n 2, at 278–283; Kaul and Kreß, above n 3, at 145–156. 
200 Tadić (Jurisdiction), above n 51, at [40]. 
31 The Unanswered “Question of Questions”: The Jurisdictional Competence of the International Criminal Court 
E Municipal Practice 
Much like the OTP,201 States do not regard territorial disputes as a bar to the exercise of 
jurisdiction.202 As States undoubtedly seek to protect their own claims and political interests, 
this is unsurprising. Such practice is, therefore, less persuasive than would be practice of an 
international criminal tribunal. However, it highlights that there is no general principle of 
comity prohibiting jurisdiction over disputed territory, and lends support to the proposition 
that the Court can determine whether the territory in question is that of a State Party.  
F The ICC as Forum non Conveniens 
Also implicit in Kontorovich’s argument is that the ICC is forum non conveniens for the 
determination of territorial title. He argues that neither the GA nor ICJ have delineated 
Palestine’s territory, and that it would be inappropriate for the ICC to act before such a 
determination is made.203 Some limited support for this approach may be found in the 
practice of the OTP. In 2012, the OTP refused to accept that Palestine was a State for the 
purposes of the Rome Statute, as Palestinian Statehood was unclear.204 The OTP stated that 
it was more appropriate to wait until the “competent organs of the United Nations or 
eventually the Assembly of States Parties resolve the legal issue”.205 It was not until the 
recognition of Statehood by the GA206 that the OTP opened a preliminary examination into 
Palestine.207 
However, for the Court to wait for such a determination in relation to disputed territory 
would be unsatisfactory. The word “disputed”, when used in relation to territory, is a simple 
“factual description of a political situation.”208 The determination of whether conduct occurs 
on a Party’s territory is, therefore, a determination of fact, not of law.209 Just as the elements 
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of an offence are proved or disproved by evaluating submissions, evidence and oral 
arguments, so too can the factual status of territory be determined by the ICC. At the most 
basic level, territorial status is a simple factual inquiry, the addressing of which the Court is 
capable. Furthermore, were the Court obliged to wait until territorial title was determined 
by external processes, this could lead to the situation where a State could indefinitely bar 
the Court’s jurisdiction by simply refusing to agree to resolution processes as to the 
underlying territorial dispute.  
A crucial point, perhaps overlooked by Kontorovich, is that any such determination by the 
Court would be of little value for any purposes other than criminal prosecution. Notably, the 
OTP’s Georgia authorisation request specifically states that the determination of Georgia’s 
territorial scope is “[f]or the purposes of this Application”,210 indicating that it is not 
intended to have any wider effect. Furthermore, the Rome Statute envisages the practice of 
the Court having limited impact on wider international law – nothing in the Statute “shall be 
interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international 
law for purposes other than [the] Statute”.211 Furthermore, the Statute is not intended to 
affect the characterisation of criminal conduct in general international law.212 Although 
these provisions relate to principles of law, and the determination of territorial title is a 
factual issue,213 these provisions imply is that a restrictive approach will be taken to any 
incidental territorial determinations made by the Court. 
Furthermore, territorial determinations of the ICC will not bind the Parties to the underlying 
dispute. Even when made by tribunals with the competence to delineate borders, territorial 
determinations only bind disputing States with their prior consent.214 Thus, were the ICC to 
determine that a crime occurred on Palestinian territory, this determination would not bind 
Israel or Palestine. In proceedings before the ICC, the parties are the prosecutor and the 
defendant. Although there is scope for States to intervene, they are not, in the same sense, 
parties. Again, the ICC has no jurisdiction over States, only over natural persons.215 The 
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States disputing the territory’s status would not, therefore, be bound by an ICC 
determination in their wider dealings. 
History also suggests that the determinations of the ICC would be of limited value in other 
dispute resolution processes. Decisions of other criminal tribunals have had little influence 
on wider international law.216 For example, Tadić (Appeal against Conviction) held that 
responsibility could attach to a defendant for conduct committed by those under their overall 
control.217 However, in the Genocide case, the ICJ rejected this test in the context of State 
responsibility218 – not because it was invalid, but because it was only suited to criminal 
responsibility.219 The same result would likely be reached in the context of disputed 
territory. All a determination of the ICC would address is whether a constitutive element of 
a crime was committed in a Party’s territory. Resolving the territorial dispute in the ICJ or 
by arbitration would concern the demarcation of borders and boundaries. The two inquiries 
are distinct, and there is ample evidence that an ICC determination would be of little wider 
impact. 
G The Monetary Gold Principle 
Finally, Kontorovich argues that any territorial determinations by the Court, where a non-
Party to the Statute was a Party to the underlying territorial dispute, would violate the 
Monetary Gold principle.220 In Monetary Gold, the ICJ held that it could not determine a 
dispute concerning interests of a State absent from the proceedings, as this would violate the 
principle of State consent.221 Kontorovich argues that, were the ICC to act in relation to 
disputed territory, this would be “as clear a violation of the Monetary Gold principle as one 
could imagine.”222 
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The Monetary Gold principle is of limited application under the Rome Statute. Prosecutions 
for the crime of aggression may not be commenced when committed by a national, or on the 
territory of, a non-Party.223 However, outside of this specific statutory incorporation, the 
Monetary Gold principle should be applied restrictively. This is consistent with the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ,224 wherein the Monetary Gold principle only applies where the 
other State’s interests constitute the “very subject-matter of the decision.”225 In ICC 
prosecutions, the “very subject-matter of the decision” is the criminal responsibility of a 
defendant for grave crimes. Any determination as to upon whose territory the conduct 
occurred is incidental, and permissible under the compétence doctrine.226 Given this, and the 
fact that the determination will not be binding but for the purposes of the Rome Statute, the 
Monetary Gold principle is not a barrier to the ICC making incidental territorial 
determinations for the limited purposes of establishing jurisdiction to prosecute. 
H The Limits of the Argument 
There are at least two further arguments which could be made that, although appearing to be 
of assistance in rebutting Kontorovich’s concerns, are unhelpful. The first comes from 
Ronen’s response to Kontorovich, which states that “[c]ircumventing the jurisdictional 
constraints of the ICC to preclude its jurisdiction is even more problematic that 
circumventing them to grant it jurisdiction.”227 
This proposition is misguided. The determination of territory is not circumventing the 
Statute. Rather, it is consistent with established international law, particularly the 
competence doctrine. Furthermore, circumventing jurisdiction to enable prosecution is 
arguably as problematic as precluding jurisdiction, particularly for the Court’s reputation. If 
the Court were to circumvent its jurisdiction, issues as to the accused’s rights and the Court’s 
legitimacy would be raised. As the determination of territory is not circumventing 
jurisdiction, but rather an inherent part of the Court’s incidental compétence, moral 
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comparisons between circumventing jurisdiction in favour of or against prosecution are 
unhelpful, and potentially dangerous. 
Second, nothing suggests that the accused cannot make challenges to territorial jurisdiction 
in cases of dispute if the non-Party State itself does not make a protest before the Court. One 
of the controversies following the Eichmann trial was the holding that Eichmann could not 
raise the violation of Argentina’s sovereignty arising from his capture by Israeli forces as a 
challenge to jurisdiction. The District Court held that this right of challenge belonged 
exclusively to Argentina, and that the accused “has no right to take over the rights of that 
State”.228 Although there is authority in support of the Eichmann proposition,229 this 
approach is inconsistent with the rights of the accused to offer a full defence, and is 
inappropriate in an international criminal tribunal.230 There can be no doubt, therefore, that 
the accused may challenge the factual status of territory, even absent support from the non-
Party State. 
I Conclusion: The Prospects for Palestine 
Although this argument has taken a more general approach to territorial disputes in the ICC, 
it would be remiss not to offer at least passing comment on Palestine. As Palestine is a 
State,231 it must be presumed that it has some territory.232 Kontorovich is correct when he 
notes that neither the ICJ233 nor the GA234 have determined where these territorial 
boundaries lie. However, there is arguably State practice to which the Court may turn in this 
regard.235 Thus, the Court has the theoretical competence to determine whether conduct in 
relation to Palestine occurs on its territory. This, of course, does not presuppose any 
particular result. 
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Although the Court has the legal capacity to make such a determination, this is a different 
question from whether it has the political will to do so. The situation in Georgia, wherein a 
territorial determination was made by the OTP,236 was significantly more clear-cut, due to 
the widespread non-recognition of South Ossetia.237 Palestine, however, is more politically 
charged. The approach of the OTP regarding Palestine to date has been subject to much 
criticism for being overtly political.238 As the OTP has recently defended allegations of 
political bias and institutional racism,239 taking action in relation to Palestine would be a 
strong indicator of sincerity behind this defensive rhetoric. 
V Objective Territoriality and the Rome Statute 
Although the ICC has not yet examined whether it is capable of applying objective 
territoriality, it appears to be relatively beyond dispute that it is so competent.240 It has, for 
example, been argued by scholars that objective territoriality is consistent with the Court’s 
territorial jurisdiction,241 and the Assembly of States Parties also sees no major controversy 
in the doctrine’s adoption.242 
That said, at least one commentator has recently argued that the plain wording of art 12(2)(a) 
bars the adoption of objective territoriality. Article 12(2)(a) permits jurisdiction where the 
“conduct in question occurred” on the territory of a State Party.243 Jean-Baptiste Maillart 
argues that the term “conduct” is traditionally understood as being distinct from the result 
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of the crime itself.244 Thus, he states, were a person in Syria, a non-Party, to fire a rocket 
into Jordan and kill civilians, this would amount to a war crime. However, it is the result 
which occurs in Jordan, the State Party, whereas the conduct which is unlawful occurred in 
Syria, thus precluding territorial jurisdiction on the basis of objectivity. 
Maillart, therefore, seeks out alternative means by which this loophole can be closed, and 
proposes a ‘constructive conduct theory’. By this approach, the criminal conduct is seen as 
“not static”, as the “conduct does not only take place where it started to take place but also 
everywhere the missile goes before causing the result of the crime.”245 Thus, the same result 
is essentially reached as were objective territoriality adopted. This reasoning is similar to 
the Farrendon case, wherein the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal held that the intent to 
wound travelled with the bullet.246 Maillart also notes similar practice in early United States 
case law.247 
However, Maillart’s argument that the adoption of objective territoriality is not possible 
based on the wording of the Statute overlooks key points. Most significantly, States 
themselves have endorsed the application of objective territoriality under art 12(2)(a).248 
Maillart’s observations are, therefore, unsupported by State practice.  
Furthermore, the mere firing of a rocket is not a criminal act alone. It is not until the civilians 
are killed that there is a war crime, and thus something which falls within the Court’s 
jurisdiction. The firing of a rocket itself, therefore, does not amount to ‘conduct’ being 
questioned by the Court, as stated by Maillart, unless an unlawful consequence occurs. Put 
another way, there is no “conduct” which the Court can “question” until the civilians are 
killed, or the “harm” occurs to borrow Maillart’s language. Thus, the adoption of a reading 
excluding the application of objective territoriality is problematic. 
The Mbarushimana decision also suggests that the Court would be open to the adoption of 
objective territoriality. In the context of a challenge to temporal jurisdiction, the Court 
looked to whether the crimes alleged to have been committed by the accused were 
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“sufficiently linked” to the referral made by the DRC.249 This language is similar to the 
sufficient link test, applicable in cases of objective territoriality, to determine if jurisdiction 
can be said to exist.250 This indicates, therefore, that the Court is willing to look at 
jurisdiction in terms of sufficiency and proximity. It should, therefore, be no great stretch to 
adopt objective territoriality, by which municipal Courts do the same. 
VI The Effects Doctrine and the Rome Statute 
A Introduction 
Although the Court may adopt objective territoriality, what is significantly more 
controversial is the argument made by Vagias that the ICC can, and should, apply the effects 
doctrine.251 Vagias offers the example of a campaign to exterminate a group on the territory 
of a non-Party, which causes mass exodus to neighbouring States Parties. This, it is argued, 
would cause “direct, substantial and immediately foreseeable socio-economic effects within 
State Party territory”.252 Vagias argues that this should serve as a sufficient jurisdictional 
basis for the Court. 
Vagias supports his argument in favour of the adoption of the effects doctrine by first 
examining policy, and then looking at the legal mechanisms by which the doctrine could be 
adopted. Such an approach, however, is unhelpful and misleading. The policy arguments for 
the expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction will always sound persuasive, as they are inevitably 
based on morality and the ending of impunity. Indeed, Vagias adopts this approach, stating 
that applying the effects doctrine is justified, as:253 
…not even the strictest of positivists would contest the view that the human lives 
in situations of genocide (usually in the developing world) are not less worthy of 
protection than the spending of a customer and the smooth operation of a certain 
market (usually in the developed world). 
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Such a proposition is misleading, and misunderstands the role of morality in a positivist 
analysis. The approach to law and morality in positivism is aptly summed up by John Austin, 
who, writing in 1832, stated:254 
The existence of a law is one thing: its merits or demerits are another. Whether a 
law be, is one inquiry: whether it ought to be, or whether it agree with a given or 
assumed test, is another and a distinct inquiry. 
Thus, were a positivist to discuss the adoption of the effects doctrine under the Rome Statute, 
they would look to what the law is, or, in other words, whether the Court could actually 
adopt the doctrine in light of 12(2)(a) and effect doctrine’s nature. In discussing policy 
arguments before his discussion of the legality of the adoption of the effects doctrine, 
Vagias’ discussion of the law becomes coloured by, perhaps meritorious, policy concerns.  
Contrary to this approach, looking first to the legality of the adoption of the doctrine, then 
to policy, leads to the opposite conclusion as that reached by Vagias – the ICC cannot adopt 
the effects doctrine as a sub-ground of its territorial jurisdiction. Such a conclusion is 
reached upon examining the plain wording of the Statute, and the contested nature of the 
doctrine in international law. Furthermore, many of Vagias’ policy arguments made in 
relation to the adoption of the doctrine, although well-intentioned, do not support his 
conclusions to the degree he suggests.  
B The Legality of Adopting the Effects Doctrine 
Vagias states that whether the Court may legally adopt the effects doctrine hinges on two 
issues: first, whether anti-competitive practices are considered crimes; and second, whether 
the effects doctrine is a valid basis of State criminal jurisdiction.255 
Whilst these issues are of some importance, there are other more crucial issues which must 
be resolved. Most obviously, the key issue is whether the wording in art 12(2)(a) permits the 
adoption of the effects doctrine. 
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1 The Conduct in Question 
Article 12(2)(a) states that the Court will have jurisdiction if the following State is a Party:256 
The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the 
crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of 
that vessel or aircraft[.] 
The crucial segment of art 12(2)(a) is the phrase “the conduct in question”. In any case 
before the ICC, the conduct which is in question is a violation of the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the Court.257 The jurisdiction of the Court is “limited to the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community”, specifically genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and aggression.258 Thus, the conduct in question before the Court can 
only be these matters. Helpfully, the later articles of the Statute259 and the Elements of 
Crimes260 outline specifically what is meant by this conduct. Conspicuously absent from 
these elements is reference to any effect other than the immediate outcome of the crime. 
Thus, on a plain reading of the Statute and the Elements, the adoption of the effects doctrine 
appears to be excluded, as wider economic effects are not the conduct which is being 
questioned before the Court.  
The conclusion that the “conduct in question” does not include effects in other States is also 
supported by the practice of the OTP in relation to ISIL. In April 2015, after the publication 
of Vagias’ book, the OTP issued a statement on the crimes allegedly committed by ISIL. 
The statement noted allegations of war crimes and genocide. However, the OTP stated that 
the Court did not have jurisdiction to try ISIL members. In terms of territoriality, the OTP 
simply noted that crimes committed by ISIL were committed in Iraq and Syria, neither of 
which are Parties to the Rome Statute.261 
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However, before the release of the OTP’s statement, mass exodus of refugees, particularly 
from Syria, occurred in unprecedented levels, directly due to the conflict.262 The ISIL 
example, therefore, is directly analogous to that given by Vagias as to when the effects 
doctrine should be applicable.263 Syrian refugees arrived en masse in European nations, the 
majority of which are Parties to the Statute. This caused substantial economic and social 
effects within the territory of States Parties. However, the OTP did not in any way assert 
territorial jurisdiction over ISIL’s crimes on the basis that they caused an effect in Europe.264 
Although the statement of the OTP generated much debate, the majority of this was centred 
on nationality jurisdiction.265 No one doubted the OTP’s statements on territorial 
jurisdiction. The lack of objection to the findings of the OTP in terms of territoriality 
indicates that the OTP, the international community, and academics collectively do not 
believe that the effects doctrine is applicable under art 12(2)(a). 
Such a conclusion is also supported by the Registered Vessels report, wherein the OTP noted 
that, if it were to assert jurisdiction over an attack on a flotilla by Israeli forces, it could only 
take jurisdiction over actions which occurred on the vessels. Nothing was seen to justify 
taking jurisdiction over conduct occurring off the vessels, despite any effects that may have 
been felt by States Parties.266 
Even if the words “the conduct in question” do not explicitly exclude the adoption of the 
effects doctrine, there is, at the very least, ambiguity as to whether they permit its adoption. 
This point is noted by Schabas, who concluded that there are “compelling arguments in 
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favour of a strict construction” of art 12(2)(a) to the exclusion of effects doctrine.267 Whilst 
these policy arguments were not substantially elaborated, one such argument is the rights of 
the accused. It is a fundamental principle of law that penal provisions should be interpreted 
strictly.268 This rule is reflected in the Rome Statute, which states that the “definition of a 
crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy.”269 Whilst, on its 
plain wording, this provision applies only to the definition of crimes, and not provisions 
governing jurisdiction, there is strong support for a wider reading of it, so as to cover other 
provisions of the Statute.270 The Court has applied this provision on strict interpretation to 
the definition of the mens rea provisions of the Statute, not merely the definitions of crimes 
per se,271 and the ad hoc tribunals have interpreted jurisdictional ambiguities in favour of 
the accused in light of similar principles.272 Thus, as there is at least ambiguity as to whether 
the doctrine may be adopted, the narrower reading in favour of the accused should be 
adopted, in line with both the Statute273 and general criminal law principles.274  
2 The Effects Doctrine and Custom 
After a review of State practice in relation to the effects doctrine, Vagias concludes that “for 
‘the most egregious violations of competition law’, there is certain acceptance of the effects 
doctrine as an interpretation of territorial criminal jurisdiction.”275 
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As has been argued, the effects doctrine cannot be said to be custom, in light of extensive 
State opinion to the contrary.276 Notably, Mann was of the view that was an “excess of 
international jurisdiction which, on account of its manifold repercussions, is of unsurpassed 
gravity”,277 and that United States had “gone astray” in utilising the doctrine.278 The wide 
protests of States also mean that it cannot be considered a general principle of law. This is 
significant, as these are the statutory bases upon which the ICC could apply the effects 
doctrine.279 An adoption of practice not consistent with these grounds of law is of 
questionable legality.280 The Court, therefore, is not competent to have recourse to the 
effects doctrine as a means of interpretation. 
Essentially, if the Court were to adopt the effects doctrine, it would be adopting the practice 
of primarily one State, the United States. The Court has, on at least one occasion, adopted a 
sole State’s practice, without recourse to the sources of law applicable under the Statute. In 
defining modes of liability in the Lubanga (Confirmation of Charges) case, the Court largely 
adopted German jurisprudence, without significant consideration of the law of other 
nations.281 Whilst this approach is questionable, in that it largely ignores the sources of law 
applicable in the Court,282 even if the adoption of one State’s jurisprudence is permissible, 
the adoption of the effects doctrine remains inappropriate. 
Unlike Germany, the United States has not ratified the Rome Statute. It would be 
inappropriate to adopt the practice of a non-Party to the Statute, especially when so many 
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States Parties do not recognise the legality of such practice. Furthermore, the adoption of 
United States practice to widen the jurisdiction of the Court would be highly ironic, given 
that the United States itself would likely be an opponent of the Court employing the doctrine, 
as it strongly campaigned to limit the Court’s jurisdictional reach.283 Finally, a perhaps 
greater irony comes from the fact that the adoption of the jurisprudence of a limited amount 
of States would be inconsistent with earlier arguments posed by Vagias himself. Vagias has 
previously stated:284 
…when it comes to territorial jurisdiction, one should be particularly mindful of 
a ‘national law orientation’ of the Court. The reasons are many, ranging from the 
imposition of one national law to an international institution composed of many 
States Parties, to arguments similar to those made by Judge Cassese in 
Erdemović.285 In his Opinion, Judge Cassese clearly outlined the dangers 
inherent in any mechanical transposition of national law solutions, developed 
within a specific legal system to address national problems, to the international 
plane. It is submitted that this line of thinking retains its validity in the present 
situation as well. 
Vagias’ earlier remarks are the perfect rebuttal to his argument in favour of the applicability 
of the effects doctrine. In essence, such an adoption would be transposing the jurisprudence 
of a sole State, which has not ratified the Statute, into the Court’s jurisdictional regime. 
Furthermore, this practice was designed to deal with national problems – detriment to 
internal commerce. The adoption of such an approach is highly problematic and of 
questionable merit. 
3 The Effects Doctrine and Criminal Jurisdiction 
Vagias argues that there is “significant State practice in support of the proposition that 
antitrust violations constitute criminal law violations”,286 and that “criminal punishment is 
increasingly being used in national law for antitrust violations.”287 Thus, as the effects 
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doctrine applies to antitrust violations, which are criminal violations, “there is certain 
support for the argument of the criminal law application of the effects doctrine on 
jurisdiction.”288  
One of the great controversies relating to the exercise of the doctrine was the fact that the 
anticompetitive behaviour it sought to regulate, whilst criminal in the United States, was 
often not criminal in the countries wherein the conduct occurred.289 This led to many States 
adopting legislation seeking to block United States attempts to gain evidence which could 
otherwise be used in a prosecution.290 The EU, too, although having adopted the effects 
doctrine in part, resists classifying antitrust violations as criminal conduct.291 There is, 
therefore, still doubt as to whether the effects doctrine applies to criminal conduct, and its 
appropriateness to address such matters. 
Even if anticompetitive behaviour is accepted to be criminal in nature, the adoption of the 
effects doctrine remains problematic. These prosecutions are for a specific type of criminal 
violation, relating largely to commercial matters. Even within this sphere, Vagias concedes 
that there is “no list available of uniformly agreed classifications across the world” or indeed 
within the United States itself, as to what constitutes an effect.292 It is also crucial to note 
that, outside of the anticompetitive cases, the United States still generally adheres to the 
traditional territoriality doctrine.293 This means that, even drawing from United States 
jurisprudence, there is little which can assist in determining what amounts to an effect of 
conduct aside from that of an economic nature. Thus, an effect includes injury to 
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commerce,294 or price-fixing,295 but the effects which can be said to flow from other crimes 
remain largely undefined. 
Even if it is accepted that there is an international consensus that anticompetitive behaviour 
is a criminal offence, there is very little practice outside of commercial proceedings in which 
the doctrine has been applied. The only case of the use of the effects doctrine in a ‘classic’ 
criminal case to which Vagias explicitly points is Mharapara, a case of theft by a 
Zimbabwean national abroad.296 However, whereas international law allows prosecution on 
the basis of nationality,297 the law of Zimbabwe did not allow prosecution on this basis.298 
Most other States would not have needed to have recourse to the effects doctrine had 
Mharapara been one of their nationals.  
The fact that other nations would have prosecuted Mharapara, and indeed any of their 
nationals offending abroad, on the basis of nationality means there is no solid jurisprudential 
basis as to what amounts to an effect of an ‘ordinary’ crime, let alone a crime within the 
Rome Statute’s jurisdiction. The lack of established jurisprudence on what amounts to an 
effect of a crime presents conceptual difficulties. For jurisdiction to be adopted under the 
effects doctrine, the effects in question must be direct, intended, foreseeable and 
substantial.299 While damage to commerce might be a direct, intended and foreseeable effect 
of anticompetitive behaviour,300 it is more difficult to see how it can be such an effect of, 
for example, a genocide. Whilst, as Vagias states, an influx of persons fleeing from genocide 
might cause economic effects in a neighbouring State,301 this certainly cannot be said to be 
intended. In fact, if the unlikely scenario arose that a person was committing an act of 
genocide with the intention to cause economic effects on a neighbouring State, there would 
be an issue as to whether the accused person had the requisite genocidal intent to be held 
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liable. To be convicted of genocide, an accused must have the specific genocidal intent to 
destroy the group in question,302 which must be the only reasonable conclusion open to the 
Court.303 Thus, if the effects doctrine requires intended effects, it cannot logically be 
applicable in cases of genocide, as its use would be self-defeating.  
Even if one takes the more liberal definition of intent as meaning “reasonably foreseeable” 
effects,304 the issue still arises as to what amounts to a reasonably foreseeable effect of any 
particular crime within the Statute. The test adopted by the United States Courts, and 
proposed by Vagias, is that of whether the effect is foreseeable to an objective reasonable 
person.305 Of course, a reasonable person would expect a crime, genocide, for example, to 
have an effect on other nations. This is because States are under an obligation to provide 
assistance to those fleeing otherwise certain death. Further, if so ordered by the Security 
Council, States are obliged to contribute resources to assist in combating these crimes.306 It 
is, therefore, reasonably foreseeable that war crimes and genocide will affect many States.  
The risk, therefore, is that the jurisdictional scheme of the Court would be opened far beyond 
what was envisaged in Rome if the effects doctrine were to be adopted, as it is reasonably 
foreseeable, and indeed inevitable, that crimes within the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction 
will have effects on many nations other than the territorial State. The adoption of a wide 
definition of effect, stemming from a lack of guidance in established jurisprudence, would 
open up the jurisdictional scheme of the Court too far. It will be recalled that the States 
Parties explicitly rejected wide-ranging jurisdiction of the Court,307 and economic, political 
and social detriment are largely regarded as too remote to permit the exercise of 
jurisdiction.308 The adoption of such wide definitions of effect would mean that the Court’s 
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territorial jurisdiction would closely resemble universal jurisdiction, which was expressly 
rejected at Rome.309  
Even a narrower definition of effect is problematic, as those effects which are reasonably 
foreseeable and directly linked to the crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction would ordinarily 
be prosecuted under other jurisdictional grounds. If, for example, the death of a national of 
a State contributing troops to a peacekeeping force were an effect, this would essentially be 
passive personality jurisdiction310 dressed up as territoriality. Likewise, if the detriment to 
the security of a neighbouring State were an effect, this would be an application of the 
protective principle311 disguised as territorial jurisdiction. Both these consequences, 
however, are more direct and foreseeable than economic detriment. Thus, the mere adoption 
of the traditional test for the applicability of the effects doctrine gives rise to definitional 
difficulties as to what amounts to an effect, particularly given the constrained bases of 
jurisdiction contained in art 12 of the Statute. 
The crucial difficulty which cannot be adequately overcome is the fact that almost all 
definitions of an effect concern some form of economic detriment. Whilst the adoption of 
such definitions of an effect may, arguendo, be possible in an international commercial 
court, it is more difficult to see how economic detriment can be adopted as a basis of effects 
jurisdiction in an international criminal court. The nexus between a war crime and economic 
detriment to a neighbouring State is less “direct”, to borrow the test applied in United States 
antitrust cases,312 than it is in cases of anticompetitive behaviour and such loss.  
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4 The Effects Doctrine and Territorial Jurisdiction 
Vagias’ argument presumes that the effects doctrine is “one of the most recent 
interpretations of territorial jurisdiction.”313 He further notes that, in many cases applying 
the effects doctrine, “the territorial element is constantly present”.314  
There is authority in support of the proposition that the effects doctrine is an extension of 
territoriality. The Laker Airways case, for example, states that “[t]he territorial effects 
doctrine is not an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction exists only when 
significant effects were intended within the prescribing territory”,315 and the Alcoa case 
concerned intended effects within United States’ territory.316 Support for this proposition is 
arguably found as far back as the Lotus case, wherein the Permanent Court of International 
Justice stated that an offence is “to be regarded as having been committed in the national 
territory, if one of the constituent elements of the offence, and more especially its effects, 
have taken place there.”317 A plain reading of this passage in Lotus seemingly equates effects 
to a constituent element of the offence, reminiscent of objective territoriality. 
However, the effects doctrine is not an extension of territorial jurisdiction. Although some 
scholars have classified it as objective territoriality,318 others continue to classify it as 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.319 As Shaw correctly notes, the main controversy around the use 
of the effects doctrine was the view that it was an exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
beyond traditionally accepted grounds.320 Likewise, Mann was also of the view that the 
doctrine amounted to extraterritorial jurisdiction, as the effect was not a constituent element 
of the offence being tried in most cases.321  
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State practice, too, indicates the effects doctrine is extraterritorial. It has been noted by the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court that the “controversial” effects doctrine is only 
“sometimes” said to be an extension of territoriality.322 Furthermore, the practice of the 
Netherlands indicates a clear view that the effects doctrine is an invalid extraterritorial 
jurisdictional ground.323 Similarly, the practice of many other States, including New 
Zealand,324 and nations of the EU,325 expresses a clear view that the effects doctrine is 
properly understood as being extraterritorial in nature.326 This is true even of some States 
which employ the doctrine.327 
The United States jurisprudence relied upon by Vagias to establish that the effects doctrine 
is territorial328 does not provide a sufficient basis to support his argument. As the doctrine 
was widely protested by other States, the United States would obviously attempt to justify 
their practice upon accepted bases of jurisdiction. However, as Mann so aptly noted:329 
…where the large majority of nations co-exists harmoniously but there is tension 
and disagreement between them and a single other State, the presumption is that 
the latter is wrong in law. This is the position in the field of international 
jurisdiction. 
Although support for the United States position is gained from Mharapara and Lotus, these 
are also of little relevance. Mharapara, which applied the effects doctrine as an extension 
of territoriality,330 is unhelpful. Most other States would have brought such a prosecution on 
the basis of nationality. The Court in Mharapara was unwilling to let jurisdictional gap lead 
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to the accused escaping punishment, particularly as State interests were at stake. As such, 
the decision is of limited probative value. As to the Lotus dictum,331 given the widespread 
criticism of the Lotus case in general, caution should be taken before placing too much 
weight on this as authority for the legality of the effects doctrine.332 
In summary, the effects doctrine, if it is a principle of jurisdiction, is an extraterritorial, not 
territorial, one. As the ICC can prosecute on the basis of territoriality,333 reading an 
extraterritorial jurisdictional doctrine into art 12(2)(a) is impossible. Thus, even if the 
doctrine is custom, and there is sufficient guidance as to what amounts to an effect, the 
simple fact is that the Court is not empowered to apply extraterritorial bases of jurisdiction, 
aside from nationality,334 absent a Security Council referral.  
C Matters of Policy 
1 A Broad Interpretation of the Statute 
As a matter of policy, it is argued by Vagias that a wide interpretation of art 12(2)(a) is 
needed to close “jurisdictional loopholes” within the Statute.335 Reference is made to the 
Finta judgment,336 for the proposition that the prosecution of war crimes by States other 
than the territorial one is one of practical necessity. This, it is argued, justifies a wide reading 
of art 12(2)(a).337 
Two important points must be made in relation to Finta. First, it was a domestic decision, 
deciding on domestic jurisdiction, before the Rome Statute was drafted. Thus, its policy 
considerations are not of automatic relevance. Second, Finta does not support the application 
of the effects doctrine. The decision of La Forest J, relied upon by Vagias, states 
“[e]xtraterritorial prosecution is thus a practical necessity in the case of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.”338 However, in the preceding text, La Forest J cites authorities 
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commonly understood as permitting universal jurisdiction, not the adoption of the effects 
doctrine.339 Notably, the judgment explicitly states that “the international community has 
encouraged member states to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity wherever 
they have been committed.”340 Thus, Finta, so far as policy is concerned, stands for the 
proposition that serious international crimes should be justiciable on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction. Contrary to the implication in Vagias’ work,341 Finta is not authority for the 
proposition that territorial jurisdiction should be read widely in the case of war crimes. It is, 
therefore, of little assistance in the context of a statutory scheme which cannot, even on the 
most liberal construction, permit universal jurisdiction. 
Equally crucial is the fact that, as previously mentioned, jurisdictional ambiguities should 
be read in favour of the accused.342 Contrary to Vagias’ suggestion,343 it is not the role of 
the Court to close “jurisdictional loopholes”. Any concerns about the closing of 
jurisdictional loopholes left open by the plain wording of the Statute, if one accepts they are 
loopholes at all, are matter of law reform, not interpretation. As unsavoury as it may be, gaps 
in the jurisdiction of any international tribunal are inevitable. In accordance with basic 
criminal law principles, such ambiguities should be interpreted in a way which favours the 
accused.344   
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That is not to say that the accused should escape liability. Prosecution may be brought 
municipally, on any State ground of jurisdiction. What it simply means is that the conduct 
of the accused, however reprehensible it may be, does not fall within the jurisdiction of one 
particular international court. 
2 Deterrence 
Vagias places reliance on the potential deterrent value of the Court, and how this may be 
widened by the adoption of the effects doctrine.345 Although deterrence is an aim of the 
ICC,346 this cannot be a basis for the expansion of jurisdiction by interpretation. Such an 
approach opens up another matter of concern. Were the Court to adopt the doctrine, and 
justify this on the basis of increasing its deterrent effect, the legitimacy of the Court would 
be called into question were there to be no evident increase in deterrent value. The ad hoc 
tribunals had little, if any, deterrent value,347 and it is not difficult to see why – the suggestion 
that “the average crazed nationalist purifier or abused child soldier” will be deterred by the 
remote prospect of prosecution is untenable.348 It is worth recalling that perpetrators outside 
the Court’s jurisdiction can still be prosecuted on the basis of universal jurisdiction. If 
deterrence had any practical effect, one might expect deterrence to have occurred on the 
basis of universality.  
Deterrence will not be increased by widening the Court’s jurisdictional scope. The number 
of prosecutions the Court can handle is not determined by the scope of its jurisdiction, but 
by the availability of finances and resources. Two general propositions, therefore, emerge. 
Firstly, the deterrent effect of the Court is uncertain at best, and placing justification on 
deterrence for an expansion of the Court’s jurisdiction may be damaging to the Court’s 
reputation if deterrence is not obviously seen. Second, even if the ICC does deter offending, 
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the increase of its territorial scope will not have a major deterrent effect while the number 
of prosecutions which may be brought remain limited by resources. Although deterrence is 
a key goal of the Court,349 discourse suggesting an expansion of its scope of jurisdiction will 
increase deterrence is premature so long as the Court’s practical jurisdiction, that is to say 
the caseload which the Court may actually take, is limited by resourcing. The adoption of 
the effects doctrine, therefore, will not have a significant deterrent impact, and deterrence 
cannot serve as a satisfactory basis for its adoption.  
3 The Seriousness of International Crimes 
Vagias states that the adoption of the effects doctrine, in relation to commercial conduct, 
ensures that “geographical distance as such does not entail immunity from antitrust 
prosecution.”350 He states that competition law and international criminal law “are therefore 
on the same page. They both aim to ‘end impunity’ and ensure that there are no ‘safe 
havens’”.351 He concludes that the adoption of the doctrine is justified, on the basis that 
international crimes should be treated as being equally serious to violations of commercial 
laws.352 
The argument that international crimes are more serious than antitrust violations is obviously 
correct. The community of nations, too, believes this. The seriousness of international 
crimes, or more specifically the ending of impunity relating to them, is the very raison d’être 
of the ICC.353 It also goes some way to explaining why there is an international criminal 
court empowered to try such crimes, and not an international commercial court with criminal 
jurisdiction over anticompetitive behaviour. However, it does not follow that the ICC should 
adopt the effects doctrine. Certainly, it would have been open to the Rome negotiators to 
have granted the Court jurisdiction on the basis of effects. The negotiators instead chose to 
grant the power to expand the Court’s jurisdiction in any particular situation to the Security 
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Council.354 The simple fact is that the effects doctrine was not a basis upon which the 
international community saw fit to grant the Court jurisdiction. 
Further evidence of the fact that international crimes are treated more seriously than 
anticompetitive conduct comes the differential treatment of the two classes of offence 
municipally. Assuming, arguendo, that prosecutions on the basis of the effects doctrine are 
valid under international law,355 there do not appear to have been any domestic prosecutions 
for serious international crimes on this basis. Rather, States exercise universal jurisdiction 
over crimes within the Rome Statute’s subject-matter jurisdiction,356 a ground of jurisdiction 
not available for antitrust violations. Thus, Vagias is correct that international crimes should 
be treated more seriously than antitrust matters.357 What is overlooked, however, is that they 
are treated more seriously. The route the international community has chosen to permit 
municipal prosecutions of serious crimes include universal jurisdiction, which offers a far 
wider jurisdictional base than the effects doctrine; and a standing court, there being no such 
equivalent for commercial offences. Although universality is not applicable in the ICC, it 
does not follow that the effects doctrine should be. It should be noted, as Vagias himself 
notes,358 that the ICC is based on the principle of complementarity. Primary responsibility 
for the prosecution of international crimes rests with States, and a case is deemed 
inadmissible if investigated by another State with jurisdiction.359 Although the inquiry into 
admissibility depends on the Court having jurisdiction, and is distinguishable from the 
jurisdictional inquiry,360 the point is that universality, rather than effects, is the basis of 
jurisdiction which States have chosen as the most appropriate for international crimes 
municipally. A simple review of State practice reveals that international crimes are already 
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treated more severely than antitrust violations, and any imagined lesser treatment of 
international crimes cannot justify reading the effects doctrine into art 12(2)(a).  
D Conclusion 
To conclude, there is simply no basis in law upon which the effects doctrine can be adopted 
by the Court. Its application is plainly excluded by the wording of art 12(2)(a). Furthermore, 
issues as to of the status of the doctrine, and its classification as territoriality, create 
ambiguities that should be interpreted in favour of the defendant. Nor are there particularly 
compelling policy arguments in favour of its adoption. 
Although the present argument proposes a narrower reading of the Court’s jurisdiction than 
that proposed by Vagias, it shares his view that international crimes are serious, and every 
effort should be made to bring perpetrators to justice. This task, however, is the 
responsibility of States in the exercise of their municipal jurisdiction, the Security Council 
in referring situations to the OTP, or perhaps the Assembly of States Parties through 
amendments to the Statute. Strained readings of the Statute, in violation of fundamental 
presumptions of criminal law, cannot be used to widen the Court’s jurisdictional scope. 
VII The Nationality Jurisdiction of the Court 
A Introduction 
Although the bulk of the present piece has addressed controversies surrounding the Court’s 
territorial jurisdiction, nationality jurisdiction also raises several issues. This is in spite of 
there having been no prosecutions on the basis of nationality to date. 
Nationality jurisdiction has a wide scope. Depending on the interpretation adopted by the 
Court, this basis of jurisdiction could be significantly wider than the Court’s territorial 
jurisdiction. The accused need be only a national of a State Party361 – no further guidance is 
given. This gives rise to significant unresolved questions as to the scope of the Court’s 
jurisdiction, the brief exploration of which shall take place below. 
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B Multiple Nationality 
Cases of multiple nationality are becoming increasingly common in the globalised world. 
This raises the issue as to how the Court is to address persons with multiple nationalities. 
For example, could the Court exercise jurisdiction over X, a soldier of non-Party State A, 
on the basis that the soldier is also a national of State Party B? Or is it more appropriate for 
the Court to borrow practice from the law of diplomatic protection, whereby the ‘dominant’ 
nationality takes precedence?362 
The plain wording of art 12(2)(b) suggests that, in cases of multiple nationalities, the Court 
need not adopt a dominant nationality test – all art 12(2)(b) requires is that the State of 
nationality is a Party. Given that the Court’s purposes include the ending of impunity,363 this 
approach is also supported by policy. Although much reliance was placed on the rights of 
the accused in resolving ambiguities earlier in the present piece, there is no such ambiguity 
in the wording of art 12(2)(b). Such a result is also consistent with State practice, which does 
not prohibit non-dominant States of nationality from exercising nationality jurisdiction.364  
That said, nationality must still be validly and legitimately granted for the ICC to exercise 
jurisdiction. Although international law does not generally restrict grants of nationality,365 
there are exceptions to this. Consider the following hypothetical: as Palestine is recognised 
as a State,366 it, in theory, has a right to grant nationality.367 There is uncertainty as to 
whether the Court would have territorial jurisdiction over the situation in Palestine. Setting 
aside any international agreements reached with Israel, could Palestine enact a law by which 
all Israeli nationals also had Palestinian nationality, thereby granting the Court nationality 
jurisdiction over the Israeli Defence Forces?  
This hypothetical grant of nationality could not be sufficient for the Court to have nationality 
jurisdiction. Although considering the merits of a grant of nationality may violate principles 
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of international comity,368 nationality grants need not be recognised if they are made to 
persons unconnected with the State.369 There must, therefore, be some connection for the 
nationality to be recognised as valid, particularly a connection to the territory of the State or 
other nationals.370 Furthermore, there is nothing objectionable about the Court looking to 
the legality of a grant of nationality in order to satisfy itself as to its jurisdiction. Thus, in 
any cases of multiple nationalities within the Court, so long as both nationalities are validly 
granted, either should be sufficient for the Court to have jurisdiction, but an unlawful grant 
of nationality cannot act as a sufficient basis. 
C Acquisition and Renunciation of Nationality 
Many States exercise nationality jurisdiction over persons who committed crimes before 
acquiring their nationality.371 Such an approach, however, cannot be adopted by the ICC. 
This amounts to retrospective criminalisation,372 the exercise of which is prohibited under 
the Rome Statute.373  
Similarly, were an accused to lose their nationality, and then subsequently commit a crime 
within the Statute’s subject-matter jurisdiction, a prosecution could not be brought on the 
basis of nationality. Such a result is explicitly excluded by the plain wording of the Statute, 
which states that there is jurisdiction if the State “of which the person accused of the crime 
is a national” is Party.374 Had the word “was” been used, however, nationality jurisdiction 
on the basis of a former nationality could have been exercised. 
D The Prospects of Nationality Jurisdiction 
In light of the preceding discussion, an exploration of the practice of the OTP in relation to 
nationality jurisdiction is timely, particularly in determining whether nationality offers a 
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practical basis of jurisdiction. Two situations are of note: first, the conduct of ISIL militants; 
second, the conduct of United Kingdom (UK) soldiers in Iraq. 
In relation to ISIL, the OTP recently released a statement on the prospects of prosecution. It 
was noted that there were crimes committed within the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. 
The Court could not exercise territorial jurisdiction, as neither Iraq nor Syria are Parties to 
the Statute. Although the Court could have theoretically exercised nationality jurisdiction 
over so-called ‘foreign fighters’ – nationals of other States who travel to Iraq and Syria to 
join ISIL – the OTP concluded that “the jurisdictional basis for opening a preliminary 
examination into this situation is too narrow at this stage.”375 In comparison, there appears 
to be no difficulty in bringing prosecutions on the basis of nationality against British 
nationals for crimes committed in Iraq.376 
The refusal of the OTP to open an investigation into ISIL sparked backlash. In particular, it 
was noted that the concept of ‘narrowness’ of jurisdiction has no basis within the Rome 
Statute.377 However, if one accepts the term ‘narrow’ to be a mere descriptor, rather than 
being a legal term of art, an understanding into the difficulties of nationality jurisdiction may 
be reached. 
As the OTP report stated, most of the high-ranking leaders of ISIL are not nationals of States 
Parties, and the purpose of the Court is to punish the most serious perpetrators.378 Although 
this matter might be better seen as being addressed at the admissibility phase of 
proceedings,379 the OTP and the Court have limited resources. The foreign fighters who 
have joined ISIL are, realistically, never going to return to their home States, as they would 
likely face prosecution there. They will likely remain in areas under the effective control of 
ISIL. This makes the bringing of prosecutions against them almost impossible until ISIL is 
defeated, or the foreign fighters in question are otherwise captured.  
Compare this situation with that of the UK forces in Iraq. Those accused of war crimes are 
still in the UK, and the UK is cooperating with the investigation. Logistically, this means 
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that matters such as the gathering of evidence, interviewing witnesses, and arresting of any 
suspects should that become appropriate, are all comparatively straightforward. By 
comparison, the opening of an investigation into the conduct of ISIL, and the eventual 
issuing of arrest warrants for foreign fighters, would be a largely symbolic gesture. Whilst 
it has been suggested that this move would increase public support for the ICC,380 it would 
be largely unjustifiable given the slim prospects of any prosecutions and the Court’s limited 
resources.  
Contrasting these two situations indicates that, unless the accused is within the territory of 
the State of nationality, or perhaps another Party, and unless that State is willing and able to 
cooperate with the Court, nationality jurisdiction will be an impractical basis of jurisdiction 
upon which to base prosecutions. 
There is, however, another sense in which nationality jurisdiction over ISIL foreign fighters 
can be said to be becoming jurisdictionally narrow, and arguably impossible. Many States 
are revoking the nationality of those who join ISIL.381 If revocation occurs before the foreign 
fighter commits any crimes within the Statute’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court cannot 
rely on nationality jurisdiction.382 Whilst many of the fighters concerned will have 
committed domestic crimes before their citizenship was revoked, there has been discourse 
towards removal of citizenship before convictions are made.383 Although joining ISIL may 
violate domestic law and international anti-terror laws, it is not a crime with the ICC’s 
jurisdiction. If a person, having had their nationality revoked, then commits a crime within 
the Statute’s subject-matter jurisdiction, they are no longer a national of the State Party, and 
the Court cannot rely on nationality jurisdiction. A strict reading of art 12(2)(b) in this regard 
is not without precedent. Nahimana held that the accused’s liability could not be based on 
conduct committed prior to the dates within the Court’s temporal jurisdiction, even if it was 
inherently connected to the later conduct. At best, it could have some probative evidential 
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value.384 It is likely that the nationality jurisdiction provision in the Statute will be similarly 
interpreted, such that the accused must have been a national at the time of the offence.385 As 
such, the actions of the States Parties to the Statute may contribute significantly to increased 
difficulties of successful nationality prosecutions. It seems likely, therefore, that, as is the 
position in terms of State jurisdiction,386 territoriality will remain the preferred and most 
practical basis of jurisdiction for the ICC to exercise. 
VIII Conclusion 
The present analysis paints what is perhaps an unfortunate picture of the ICC’s jurisdictional 
scheme. While the Court has the competence to exercise jurisdiction over disputed territories 
and on the basis of objective territoriality, it cannot aptly adopt the effects doctrine. 
Likewise, the nationality jurisdiction of the Court is unlikely to prove to be a practical basis 
of jurisdiction for the Court to commence prosecutions in many serious instances of 
offending. Despite the gravity of the crimes which fall to be tried by the Court, no 
considerations of morality justify strained readings of the Statute in a manner contrary to 
fundamental criminal law principles.387 
This rather unhappy result, in terms of the Court’s goal to end impunity, may be addressed 
in three ways. First, the States Parties may amend the Statute’s jurisdictional scheme.388 
Such an outcome is unlikely, as any amendment of the Statute requires a two-thirds majority 
vote of Parties before it can be undertaken,389 and jurisdiction of the Court is a highly 
controversial topic.390 Second, the Security Council could use its Chapter VII powers to 
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refer situations to the Court,391 bypassing the ordinary jurisdictional requirements.392 
Unfortunately, the Security Council has a lack of political will to act in many of the most 
serious situations, given that the interests and actions of permanent members would be called 
into account.393 This will be particularly so if it is correct that the Council members cannot 
exclude the conduct of their own nationals in referred situations from investigation.394 
This leaves the third, and most plausible, option – an increased role of States in ending 
impunity. If it is accepted that States may exercise universal jurisdiction,395 then although 
the crimes within the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction may not be justiciable within the 
ICC, they remain so within individual States. As the Court is intended to be complementary 
to national criminal jurisdictions,396 there is nothing untoward with States continuing, and 
increasing, their efforts to combat impunity through universal jurisdiction. Such a result is a 
more preferable way of addressing impunity than adopting strained readings of the Statute. 
Simply put, the inherent and intended narrowness of the Court’s jurisdictional scheme means 
it cannot be an entity to end impunity without strong national efforts in the same vein. 
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